What is Feminism in China?

For the first time in 25 years, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) sees no women in its 20th Politburo elected by the Central Committee of the Chinese Community party (CCP). Its lack of female representation sets a worrying direction for women’s rights and status, and feminist ideologies. While it is clear that women in China still lack both numbers and political influence, many policies towards women enacted by CCP had not been explicitly oppressive. CCP’s founder, Mao Zedong, was known for proclaiming that “women hold up half the sky” and had successfully rallied women to support his cause through different “feminist” policies such as the Marriage Law and the Land Law that had addressed women’s unhappiness after the Chinese Civil War (Li, 2000). Most importantly, he had allowed women to enter the labour force; improving women’s social-economical status (Yang, 2020). Yet, those policies had not shown results in terms of women’s roles in modern Chinese society.

Political regimes and by extension, political participation of women has contributed to the political gender gap. The imbalance in political power, knowledge and awareness between genders, perpetuated by patriarchal political culture, has excluded women from the public sphere of politics (Ahmad et al., 2019). Unlike Western feminism, Chinese feminism today is quiet on international and local media. Are there no meaningful discussions of Chinese feminism within China’s politics just because there are no women? By examining the political struggles of women after the Chinese Civil War, this paper seeks to define present-day Chinese feminism in the political landscape through a). Chinese socialisation and b) China’s political system.

Women in CCP’s Ambitions 

Post Chinese Civil War, CCP had envisioned the newly established PRC as a communist utopia.  Thus, they had led several large-scale economic, political and cultural constructions that would rapidly develop China (Wang, 2014). Under Mao, women had been actively involved in China’s largest political reforms, leading up to the twenty-first century. In this section, we will discuss the political mobilisation of Chinese women and how it has shaped modern Chinese socialisation.

China’s Great Leap Forward (1958-1962)

China’s Great Leap Forward (GLF) took place a decade after CCP won the Chinese Civil War and rose into power. GLF is often considered as one of the greatest man-made disasters; a policy failure that has killed an estimated 15 to 45 million people (Hsiung & Wang, 2018). Mao had wanted to build a “fully socialist agricultural system” in the shortest amount of time; his peasant population gave everything – their grains, their children and themselves – to meet the government’s demands (Xun, 2012). This had actually increased women’s employment as China had immobilised its entire peasant population to till its lands, allowing rural women to achieve a seemingly equal status with rural men in agricultural work (Yihong et al., 2006). However, China could not sustain such rapid developments. As the CCP wanted more, people suffered more. There was some resemblance of equality between rural men and women but no equality between social classes.

The GLF campaign would inevitably lead to the Great Famine (GF) that lasted until 1961. CCP had never released the exact figures on the total death tolls from the three-year famine, so most researches were based on national census data and data personally collected (曹, n.d.). CCP had even worded the GF was as “三年自然灾害”, meaning “three-year natural disaster”, in its old history textbooks, until the 1980s (BBC, 2009). It is clear that the CCP had tried to cover up the tragedy, both within and outside of their borders. While Contemporary China has acknowledged the policy failure, it is still unwilling to openly discuss what has happened during GLF (Smil, 1999). Many scholars throughout the years had tried to uncover the truth by gathering their own data through verbal methods such as interviewing survivors of the GF, contributing to the field of study. In order to survive, women resorted to prostitution to exchange for food, parents sold their children, and many had resorted to human cannibalism (Alphahis, 2020). In addition, empirical studies on mortality rates had found that due to the implications from the lack of foetal nutrition; the GF would affect rural female survivors more than rural male survivors in later life, highlighting the consequences of existing social disparities (Mu & Zhang, 2011). However, attempts to expose CCP had politicised the suffering of rural women, depicting them as helpless victims – the only victims – instead of promoting any meaningful discussions about the suffering of the peasant population (Xun, 2012). Such portrayals of women may be impactful in highlighting the fundamental problems of the GLF, but it has discounted the experiences of all survivors and only further stereotypes Chinese women as weak.

Cultural Revolution (1966 - 1976)

Following the failure of GLF, Mao had lost support from CCP and was growing more paranoid about his position, his party members and China’s slow shift away from communism (Wu, 2014). He then launched his final political campaign, the Cultural Revolution (CR), to preserve said Chinese communism by purging any anti-revolutionary sentiments (Lieberthal, 2022). The CR was essentially a violent struggle of power, political ideologies and social class, compounded by whatever that had conspired between Mao and his party members, that involved the entire Chinese population. Laying the groundwork for mass social labour organisation during the GLF campaign, CCP's political mobilisation during CR was easy. Men and women were mobilised to fight, and ordered to dress and look the same; sporting ear-level hairstyles and similar uniforms (Wu, 2014). Women were no longer differentiated from men. Yet, instead of empowerment, it has led to an erosion of female identity in CR. It became apparent that women's issues were secondary to the ongoing political struggles (Li, 2000). However, women as the other gender were exploited in these political struggles. The “People’s daily” newspaper (人民日报, Renmin ribao), controlled by CCP, would publish articles written by or signed by women to rally from these social groups for support (Yihong et al., 2006).  Female participation during the revolution became some sort of political symbolism to fuel the population’s outrage and descend to madness, taking the lives of many.

Mao’s proclamation that “women hold half the sky” had never directly addressed gender inequalities; his policies had only served to further his political agenda. While the gender gap has undeniably decreased due to increased women labour participation, it was only because CCP needed people to fulfil their goals. Gender equality norms had not been internalised and Chinese socialisation pre-2000s has been limited for women’s rights. Women were used as a symbolic figure for political discussions, but not as a social group that inherently has rights for discussion. The Chinese female identity had not developed like in the West, even as women took on men’s jobs by participating in agricultural work during the GLF and taking up arms in the CR. At the peak of China’s revolutionaries after the Chinese Civil War, where there is seemingly high female participation, we do not see the Chinese female identity, instead, women became indistinguishable from men under Mao’s ideals. Chinese women had been oppressed, controlled, and exploited by Mao’s policies, disguised as “betterment” of the country, continuing to modern times.

Contemporary China

Discussions about women’s status and rights are not strictly forbidden in contemporary China. However, that does not translate into feminist activists. Given the top-down nature of authoritarian China; the policies enacted and the lack of female representation in higher politics has resulted in low numbers of feminist activities on all levels of society. This section will discuss more about existing feminist efforts in relation to the political structure and presence of women in CCP.

The Feminist Five

To preface the situation in socialist China, feminist movements are strongly frowned upon and signal that women are aware of their positions in the existing relations of power and have intentions to do something about it (Wu & Dong, 2019). The top-down nature of Chinese society has led to the lower levels of society to simply internalise sexist values without consciousness, leading to daily encounters with gender inequalities (Zheng, 2015). For Chinese women, it means sexual harassment from men. On the eve of International Women’s Day (6th March 2015), five feminists were arrested for planning to hand out stickers on public transport to raise awareness on sexual harassment (Fincher, 2016). These five would later be known as China’s “Feminist Five”, as the news of their arrest attracted attention from international media. Their attempts to promote gender equality by raising awareness on sexual harassment and domestic violence were seen as radical unlike the state controlled All-China Women’s Federation that urges women to be loyal to the government (Fincher, 2016).

The timing of the arrests had only highlighted CCP’s ignorance of global feminist movements; and their paranoia that these liberal women would threaten the CCP’s legitimacy and the Chinese socialisation that women will always be beneath men (Zheng, 2015). When women’s income increases, men’s income increases much faster; when employment rates are reduced, women’s decline is more pronounced than for men (Yang, 2020). Even though China has made improvements in women’s labour participation and education, women will always be disadvantaged because it is not women who rule China. Chinese feminism is fundamentally different from Western feminism; Chinese women need to overcome social hurdles set by history, CCP’s political ideologies where only men hold power and women’s existing dependency on men; it is a political struggle against governance, not within governance.

Female representations in Xi Jinping’s CCP

We have established that Chinese women are often seen as a symbolic representation; female representation is forcefully thrusted into political settings by men when convenient (as seen in the segments covering GLF, GF, CR) but rejected when it is women themselves who want to participate in political situations. Therefore, it was to no one’s surprise that women were, as usual, excluded from the Politburo Standing Committee of the CCP (highest decision-making body) of patriarchal China. It was, however, shocking to see no women being elected into the Politburo for the first time in 25 years, to succeed after Sun Chunlan’s retirement from the Politburo. 

Sun Chunlan, 72, is the 2nd highest-ranked vice Premier of the State Council and one of the eight women to be elected into the Politburo in CCP’s history (uschina, 2018).  A blue-collared woman with no elite connections until she was elected, Sun’s political resume is nothing but impressive (Campbell, 2022). The opportunity for a woman to participate in politics as a politician is uncommon, but there have been progress through gender quotas. China had actually been an early adopter of gender quotas, though implementation of quota strategies had not been consistent and effective (Wang, 2015). For example, there is a party mandate gender quota requiring at least one woman in every layer of government up to provincial level, but that does not apply to the higher bodies like the Politburo and the Standing committee (Stevenson, 2022). Often, gender quotas are used to increase female representation due to an increasing social concern over gender equality and women’s rights. In China’s case, gender quotas are used for political gains, playing an important role in CCP’s mass mobilisation during its revolution and socialist development eras (Wang, 2015). As such, gender quotas are only beneficial to women when the CCPs overall political agenda and priorities converge with its commitment to improve women’s lives (Wang, 2015). Promotions within CCP is another hurdle for female politicians. Women in CCP are often tasked with “softer” areas such as healthcare and education, or treated as mere “decorations”, making it more difficult for women than men to be promoted (Clemens & Walter, 2019). These conditions only further obstruct women from scaling CCP’s political ladder, making Sun’s political accomplishments more respectable. Yet, in the context of championing for gender equality, is it appropriate to label Sun as Chinese women’s heroine, or is this another underlying issue of China’s political structure? 

Discourse on Gender and Power

The problem with the world of men is that it establishes masculinity as a bond to the patriarchal world of power, and that social power is further differentiated by race, nationality, class and other social classes (Kaufman, 1994). Power is concentrated in a select few, as seen in the structure of CCP where China’s most powerful people are Chinese, men, and born during the Maoism era (1950s). Other men would be inclined to comply with these men, if power can allow them to live comfortably.  Women, who are already in the disadvantaged position, will be more likely to comply with social norms set by men in power. The top of Chinese society, however, experiences a different problem. In an authoritarian state like China, people like Xi face higher political costs than his democratic counterparts when subordinates successfully challenge him (Thomas, 2020). As such, people who hold positions in the higher politics of CCP are all supporters of Xi. This would include Sun; we see a difficult give-and-take relationship between gender and politics. Power has made authoritarian leaders fearful of liberal movements from its population, leading to suppression of other social groups, like the Feminist Five, that have differing agendas. Politics and power strongly hinders the progression of gender equality, while not exclusive to China, social power has perpetuated negative social norms and behaviours against women. Women interested in politics are then left with three main choices: a) To join CCP and conform to their ideals, b) To advocate for their own rights and go against CCP and c) To stay silent and live quietly; in which many would rather be subordinates and stay silent.

Closing remarks

To understand Chinese feminism, we had previously isolated feminist movements within China from the international platform. Women’s rights is a political, threatening problem to China’s stability; not an issue of social equality present that is worth debating for Chinese society in fear of challenging the authoritarian CCP. Chinese feminism is facing a stagnation in contemporary China as women are gated from participating in its higher politics. This distinguishes China from other countries that had made progress through their successes in descriptive representation of women, albeit not exclusive in China. Although China keeps a tight control over its general population, there is inevitable exposure to western media and international feminism. By the time the Feminist Five were released, there were over two million signatures on petitions against CCP’s decision to arrest these feminists (Wang, 2015). It is rather speculative if China was pressured to release them due to international attention, but nevertheless a step forward in the progression of women’s rights. However, should Chinese feminism remain as it is? Or rather, can it continue as it is? Ultimately, that is up for debates and for Chinese women to decide. Decades of Chinese socialisation that oppressed women, driven by CCP’s political ideologies is not easy to overcome with only a few women. 

If embodiment of feminist ideologies is women empowerment and advocacy for ‘true’ democracy where women can actively participate in political and social discussions without prejudice; then it is even more important for more women to be elected into the higher politics of CCP and we should still celebrate women like Sun who has been alone at the top. That said, feminism as sites of  “participatory democracy” raises another question on the inclusivity of feminism; often, gender intersects with other social groups such as race and social classes (Eschle, 2000). This is reflected in most parts of the world and an international issue that global citizens must address as society progresses. 

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